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,	CAMPAIGN TO	INSTALL PRO-WE	STERN GOVERNM	ENT IN IRAN
٠	AUTHO	RITY: 7, Grann	I him	,
			n ")	uly 1953
TARO	EET	<u></u>		
I	Prime Minister Mos	sad eq a nd his gover	nment	
OBJE	CTIVES	•		
7	Through legal, or qu	asi-leval, methods	to affect the fall of	l the Manager
	overnment; and		, creat me rest of	the Mossaded
	_	. :		
anna an	o replace it with a p	pro-Western govern	ment under the Sh	ah's leadership.
¥	ith Zahedi as its Pr	ime Minister		2 (A.)
CIA	ACTION	•	``	
F	lan of action was in	aplemented in four	ohases:	
· S	1:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	·	
:	o strengthen the Shal	h's will to exercise	his constitutional	power and to sign
t i	nose decrees necess	ary to effect the le	gal removal of Mos	sadeq as Prime
. 1	linister;			
	2. Welded togeth	ner and coordinated	the efforts of thos	e political fac-
		The state of the s	يعافين الأوراع ويستريها	the ship of the first and a limit of the
	The second of the second secon	e antaronistic lowa	The state of the s	And the second s
	illy influential clerg		_ •	any legal action
ta	ken by the Shah to a	ccomplish Mossade	eq's removal;	
•	3.			disenchant
tl	e Iranian population	with the myth of M	ossadeq's patriotis	sm, by exposing
	is collaboration with	*		* *
	•:			or constitutional
	uthority to serve his	own personal amb	tions for power;	
				the second section of the
	•	EO 1352	26 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs	

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Simultaneously, conducted a "war of nerves" against Mossadeq designed to reveal to Mossadeq and to the general populace that increased economic aid would not be forthcoming and that the U.S. viewed with alarm Mossadeq's policies:

- a. A series of public statements by high U.S. officials implying that there was little hope that Mossadeq could expect increased U.S.
- b. U.S. press and magazine articles which were critical of him and his methods; and

c. absence of the American Ambassador, lending credence to the impression that the U.S. had lost confidence in Mossadeq and his government.

RESULTS

The original D-Day set by CIA misfired when Mossadeq, learning of the plan through a leak

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counteraction to neutralize the plan.

was launched in the interim period between the original and final D-Days to educate the Iranian population to the fact that, in view of the dissolution of the Majlis (effected by Mossadeq at an earlier stage to prevent its voting

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him out of power) and the Shah's decree removing Mossadeq as Prime Minister, Mossadeq's continued exercise of the powers of that office was illegal and that authority to govern the people rested solely and completely in the hands of the Shah.

The Nationalists and the Communists during this period inadvertently assisted our cause through their premature attempts to promote a republican government. This theme was contrary to the public's opinion, whose sympathies were with the Shah. The Shah's dramatic flight out of the country served to further intensify his people's sense of loyalty to him.

These actions resulted in literal revolt of the population,

military, were forced to act in quelling the riots and gained strength on the cul mossadeg was forced to flee on 17 Huq 53 momentum of the situation in support of the Shah:

The ouster of Mossadeq was successfully accomplished on 19 Aug 1953.

NOTE

2. That an adequate amount of U.S. interim economic aid would be forthcoming to the successor government.

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